Despite these wins, Citino identifies several fatal flaws that led to the "death" of the Wehrmacht as an effective fighting force:
: Germany’s military was built for short, decisive "wars of movement." In 1942, they were forced into a war of attrition against the "industrial machines" of the US, UK, and USSR—a battle they simply could not win. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 Death of the Wehrmacht :The German Campaigns of...
: Rebounding from the 1941 winter disaster, German forces secured massive victories at Sevastopol and Kharkov, encircling entire Soviet armies. Despite these wins, Citino identifies several fatal flaws
In his seminal work, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 , historian Robert M. Citino argues that the year 1942 was not just a turning point in World War II, but the final gasp of a centuries-old "German way of war". While 1941’s failure at Moscow hinted at the end, 1942 was when the traditional Prussian tactics of maneuver ( Bewegungskrieg ) finally collapsed under the weight of modern industrial warfare. The Illusion of Victory Citino argues that the year 1942 was not
: General Erwin Rommel’s "reckless" drive captured Tobruk and Gazala, pushing deep into Egypt. The Structural Collapse
: The traditional Auftragstaktik (mission-type tactics)—which allowed subordinate commanders great flexibility—was strangled by Hitler's increasing micromanagement and the rise of radio communication, which gave high command a "tight leash" on tactical movements.