2007. An Institutional Theory Of Sanctions Onse... (2025)

Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure.

: In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition. Economic pain felt by the broader public directly threatens the leader's support base, making them more likely to concede. 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...

The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition" Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to

: The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics may "overproduce" sanctions as a policy tool due to domestic demands from various interest groups within their own large winning coalitions. Summary of Hypotheses Institutional Effect Sanction Success The 2007 article "," published in the Journal

Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by sanctions to reward loyalists.

: For sanctions to work, they must create enough political pressure on the leader's "winning coalition"—the essential group of supporters needed to stay in power.

Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain states are targeted in the first place: